We analyze a general search model with on-the-job search and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. This model yields a simple relationship between (i) the unemployment rate, (ii) the value of non-market time, and (iii) the max-mean wage di¤erential. The latter measure of wage dispersion is more robust than measures based on the reservation wage, due to the long left tail of the wage distribution. We estimate this wage di¤erential using data on match quality and allow for measurement error. The estimated wage dispersion and mismatch for the US is consistent with an unemployment rate of 5%. Finally, we …nd that without search frictions, output would be 6.6% higher.
Introduction
Relative to a competitive economy, an economy with search frictions generates less output because (i) there are idle resources like unemployed workers, (ii) resources are spent on recruitment activities, and (iii) the assignment of workers to jobs is sub-optimal. The interaction between the importance of a precize match and frictions is a key determinant for the allocation of workers to jobs. If all unemployed workers and jobs were alike, it would be hard to imagine why it would take workers months to …nd a suitable job. But also if workers and jobs are heterogeneous but search frictions are absent, workers will instantaneously be employed at their optimal job types and it does not matter how much output falls if a worker is matched with a sub optimal job type. This paper derives and estimates the output loss due to search frictions allowing for this interaction between frictions and the substitutability of worker types.
Speci…cally, we analyze a class of search models with on-the-job search (OJS) and heterogeneous workers and jobs. As a starting point we take the framework of Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010) where the productivity of a match is decreasing in the distance between worker and job type and where employed workers continue moving towards the most productive jobs. We use a production technology that can be interpreted as a second order Taylor approximation of a more general production function. Within this framework, various wage mechanisms can be analyzed like wage posting with full commitment as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and wage mechanisms without commitment as in Coles (2001) and Shimer (2006) . The key di¤erence between wage setting with and without commitment is that in the …rst case, …rms pay both hiring and no quit premia to hire/ keep workers whereas in the latter case, the only reason for …rms to pay workers above their reservation wage is to prevent them from quitting. The equilibrium is characterized by a relationship between just three statistics: (i) the unemployment rate, (ii) the value of non-market time, and (iii) a summary statistic for wage dispersion between identical workers, the max-mean wage di¤erential. We show that this statistic is more informative and more robust than alternatives like the ratio of the mean wage to the reservation wage (i.e. the mean-min ratio of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2010 ).
This relation hardly depends on any of the model's parameters, except for the relative e¢ ciency of on-versus o¤-the-job search, ; and the value of non-market time. For the calculation of the total output loss due to search frictions for a given unemployment rate, even the e¤ect of is a higher order phenomenon.
The combination of two-sided heterogeneity and search frictions relates our model to the literature on hedonic pricing in the spirit of Rosen (1974) , Sattinger (1975) and Teulings (1995 Teulings ( ,2005 . The last three of those models are hierarchical, in the sense that better skilled workers have a comparative advantage in more complex jobs. In a Walrasian equilibrium, there is perfect sorting. With search frictions, this perfect correlation between worker and job types breaks down, since workers cannot a¤ord to wait for ever till the optimal match comes along. Shimer and Smith (2000) and Teulings and Gautier (2004) are early examples of assignment models with search frictions. Hierarchical models are di¢ cult to solve because matching sets in the corners of the type space do not have interior boundaries. We therefore …rst transform the hierarchical model into a circular model in the spirit of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2008) .
The idea is that output is decreasing in the distance between worker and job types along the circumference of the circle. This makes it possible to derive a closed form solution of the equilibrium. When turning to the empirical analysis of data on individual wages, and on worker and job characteristics, we have to reintroduce the hierarchical aspect of the model.
Ultimately, the usefulness of our model depends on how well it can simultaneously describe the observed wage dispersion for a given skill type due to mismatch, the unemployment rate, and the ratio of job-to-job versus unemployment-to-job worker ‡ows.
We show that the equilibrium unemployment rate in our model that is consistent with the observed amount of wage dispersion is 5% which seems reasonable. Given that our model performs well, it can be used to calculate the total output loss due to search frictions which we estimate to be about 6.5%. The majority of the output loss is due to recruitment activities and mismatch. Hornstein et.al. (2010) also derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate and wage dispersion that holds for a large class of search models. They argue that search models without OJS cannot explain the coexistence of low unemployment rates and substantial wage dispersion because the …rst suggests low frictions and the latter suggests high frictions. Gautier and Teulings (2006) made the related point that without OJS, estimates of output losses due to search frictions based on the unemployment rate are substantially lower than estimates based on wage dispersion. Allowing for OJS and unobserved heterogeneity can resolve this issue. OJS lowers the reservation wage which increases wage dispersion for a given unemployment rate. As in Hornstein et al. (2010) this requires a su¢ ciently large contact rate for employed workers.
Similarly, Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) construct a measure based on the distance between the lowest and highest wage. One disadvantage of relating wage dispersion to the lowest observed wage (see also the mean-min ratio of Hornstein et.al.,2010 ) is that the wage distribution for a given skill type has a long left tail. This long tail is consistent with OJS for the reasons spelled out in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) : (i) OJS reduces the lowest acceptable job type because less option value of continued search has to be given up when accepting a job, and (ii) less workers quit from good matches and more workers accept good matches. Empirically, it matters a lot whether one takes the 1 th or the 2 nd percentile of the wage distribution as a proxy for the reservation wage. Therefore, the di¤erence between the highest wage at the optimal assignment and the mean wage (the max-mean di¤erential) is a more robust measure for wage dispersion.
In the equilibrium where …rms are unable to commit, quasi-rents per worker are higher than in the social optimum due to a business-stealing externality. Under free entry, these quasi-rents are spent on (excess) vacancy creation, see Gautier, Teulings and van Vuuren (2010) . We estimate the output loss due to this business-stealing externality to be 1% (if no …rm commits relative to the case where all …rms commit and if frictions are such that the unemployment rate under commitment is 5%).
The empirical estimate of the max-mean wage di¤erential for identical workers in heterogeneous jobs is an extension of the framework of Gautier and Teulings (2006) with OJS. Our estimate is based on the intercept of a simple quadratic wage regression with appropriately normalized measures for worker and job characteristics. This type of inference is highly sensitive to measurement error in both characteristics because an observed sub-optimal matched worker can either re ‡ect true mismatch, or simply imply measurement error. Our estimation procedure accounts for this problem. Gautier and Teulings (2006) use second order terms in worker and job characteristics to capture the concavity of wages around the optimal assignment that is implied by search models with sorting.
However, there is a crucial di¤erence between a model with and without OJS. In a model without OJS, wages are a linear transformation of the match surplus. Since the match surplus is a di¤erentiable function of the match quality indicator, so is the wage function.
This simple relation no longer applies with OJS, see Shimer (2006) . The wage function turns out to be non-di¤erentiable at the optimal assignment. At that point, …rms are prepared to pay the highest premiums to raise hiring and to reduce quitting. In our empirical application, we take this into account. Allowing for OJS is important since Fallick They derive a similar hump shaped relation where productivity is highest at the optimal assignment and decreases in the distance from this optimal assignment. This framework is however less suitable to bring to the data.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework. Section 3 discusses the basic steps in our argument. In this section, we also reinstall the hierarchical features of the model and derive the wage function that comes with it. We also show how we can normalize worker and job skills such that we can relate the constant in a simple wage regression to the max-mean wage di¤erential. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The model 2.1 Why a circular model? Shimer and Smith (2000) and Teulings and Gautier (2004) analyze an assignment model with heterogeneous workers and jobs with search frictions. Though the idea is appealing, the analysis of this type of models is complicated. Figure 1 provides an intuition for why this is the case. The …gure shows the space of potential matches between skill types, s, and worker types, c. The Walrasian equilibrium assignment is depicted by the main diagonal. Comparative advantage of skilled workers in complex jobs implies that it is upward sloping. Perfect sorting implies that it is a one-to-one correspondence. Search frictions make that the equilibrium assignment is a set rather than a single point where the mismatch indicator x measures the distance of worker type s to her optimal assignment.
The optimal match is some interior point of the matching set. Teulings and Gautier (2004) use second order Taylor expansions to characterize the equilibrium. The same approach can be applied to the option value of search for a job seeker. Figure   1 shows why this approach works …ne for the middle part of the distribution, but does not work well for the tails of the distribution: in the tails there is no interior solution for either the upper or the lower bound of the matching set. This "corner problem"
complicates the characterization of the equilibrium in this type of models tremendously. Teulings and Gautier (2004) show that their Taylor expansion provide a fairly accurate characterization of the equilibrium for not too large search frictions, that is, for not too high unemployment rates.
Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2005) use an alternative approach. They show that by taking out the hierarchical aspect of the model, the south-west and the north- 1 Theoretically, the surface should be weighted with the density of job seekers for each worker type s.
When this density function is di¤erentiable, the variations in the density have only third or higher order e¤ects on the option value, see Teulings and Gautier (2004) , Proposition 2. The intuition is that the density weighted matching set has more mass at the right and less mass at the left and both approximately o¤set each other. Hence, using a uniform vacancy distribution (as we do in the paper) is not restrictive.
east corner of the matching space can be "glued" together. Then, a circular model in the spirit of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) can be used, see the lower part of Figure 1 .
The distance x to the optimal assignment is now measured along the circumference of the circle. The advantage of using a circular model is that it has closed form analytical 
Assumptions Production
There is a continuum of worker types s and job types c; s and c are locations on a circle.
Workers can only produce output when matched to a job. The productivity of a match of worker type s to job type c depends on the "distance" jxj between s and c along the circumference of the circle, where x is de…ned as x s c. Y (x) has an interior maximum at x = 0 and is symmetric around this maximum (which is normalized to one) Finally, Y (x) is twice di¤erentiable and strictly concave. We consider the simplest functional form that meets these criteria:
We will call x is the mismatch indicator. The parameter determines the substitutability of worker types. Y (x) can be interpreted as a second order Taylor approximation around the optimal assignment of a more general production technology. Since, the …rst derivative of a continuous production function equals zero in the optimal assignment, Y 0 (0) = 0, the …rst order term drops out. We are interested in equilibria where unemployed job seekers do not accept all job o¤ers, which imposes a minimum constraint on .
2
Labor supply and the value of non market time Labor supply per s-type is uniformly distributed over the circumference of the circle.
Total labor supply in period t equals L(t). Unemployed workers receive the value of non market time B. Employed workers supply a …xed amount of labor (normalized to unity) and their payo¤ is equal to the wage they receive. Workers live for ever. They maximize the discounted value of their expected lifetime payo¤s.
Labor demand
There is free entry of vacancies for all c-types. The cost of maintaining a vacancy is equal to K per period. After a vacancy is …lled, the …rm's only cost is the worker's wage. The unit of c.
Job search technology
We use a reduced form speci…cation of the job search technology:
and assume that the rate at which unemployed workers meet jobs is and the rate at which employed workers meet jobs is . The parameter ; 0 1; measures the relative e¢ ciency of on-relative to o¤-the-job search; = 0 is the case without OJS; for = 1, on-and o¤-the-job search are equally e¢ cient. When a worker quits her old job, this job disappears.
Job destruction
Matches between workers and jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate > 0.
Golden-growth path
We study the economy while it is on a golden-growth path, where the discount rate > 0 is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. We normalize the labor force at t = 0 to one.
Hence, the size of the labor force is L(t) = exp( t). The assumption of a golden-growth path buys us a lot in terms of transparency and tractability. The implications of the golden growth assumptions are equivalent to those that follow from the assumption that the discount rate converges to zero, an assumption that is often applied in the wage posting literature, see for example Burdett and Mortensen (1998) because discounting reduces future output while population growth increases it. New workers enter the labor force as unemployed.
Labor supply per worker type and the productivity in the optimal assignment Y (0) are normalized to one. Hence, in the absence of search frictions, the output of this economy equals one.
Wage setting
Wages, denoted by W (x), are set unilaterally by the …rm, conditional on the mismatch indicator x in the current job. We analyze wage setting under two di¤erent assumptions.
Under the …rst assumption, …rms can commit to a future wage payment contingent on x.
Then, …rms pay both no-quit and hiring premiums, that is, they account for the positive e¤ect of a higher wage o¤er on reduced quitting and increased hiring. Under the second assumption, …rms are unable to commit to future wage payments. In this case, hiring premiums are non-credible because immediately after the worker has accepted the job, the …rm has no incentive to continue paying a hiring premium, since the worker cannot return to her previous job. Workers anticipate this, and will therefore not respond to this premium in the …rst place, and hence, …rms will not o¤er it. No-quit premiums are credible even without commitment because it is in the …rm's interest to pay them as soon as the worker has accepted the job. 3 
The asset values of (un)employment and vacancies
The golden-growth assumption is particularly useful for the derivation of the asset values of employment, unemployment, and vacancies.
Asset value of unemployment
The asset value of unemployment, denoted by V U is a weighted average of the worker's payo¤ while unemployed, B, and the expected wage when employed, E x W , the weights being the unemployment and the employment rate, respectively:
The derivation of this and the subsequent Bellman equations can be found in the technical appendix A.1 to this paper. Why does this relation take such a simple form? The reason is that the growth rate of the workforce is equal to the worker's discount rate. Therefore, the expected payo¤ of a worker with one year of experience is equal to the average payo¤ of the cohort of workers that entered the labor force one year ago. Likewise, the expected payo¤ of a worker with two years of experience is equal to the average payo¤ of the cohort of workers that entered the labor market two years ago, etc. The asset value of unemployment is equal to the weighted sum of expected payo¤s for each level of experience, future payo¤s being discounted at a rate per year. This weighted sum is exactly equal to the sum of payo¤s for the current workforce. The fact that older cohorts are smaller than younger cohorts due to the growth of the labor force at a rate exactly o¤sets the e¤ect of discounting future payo¤s for the calculation of the asset value of unemployment. The term (1 u)E x W can be interpreted as the option value of …nding a job. Alternatively, when ! 0, workers spend a fraction u of their life as unemployed and the rest of the time they are employed.
Asset value of employment in the marginal job
Let V E (x) be the asset value of holding a job with mismatch indicator x. At x, an unemployed job seeker is indi¤erent between accepting the job or waiting for a better
Again, the asset value for this job is a weighted average of
and E x W ,
The factor u + (1 u) is the e¤ective supply of job seekers, namely u unemployed and
(1 u) employed job seekers. The latter are discounted by a factor due to their lower search e¤ectiveness. Hence, the weights in equation (3) are the shares of unemployed and employed respectively in the e¤ective supply. The intuition for this equation is that the acceptance sets are the same for an unemployed and a employed job seeker at his marginal job, both accept any job: 0 jxj < x. However, the option value of search for an employed worker is only a fraction of the option value of an unemployed due to their lower contact rate. The value of non market time B does not show up in the
eliminating B from the equation. For 0 < < 1, unemployed job seekers give up part of the option value of search by accepting a job and they need to be compensated for this, implying that W ( x) > B. For = 1, on-and o¤-the-job search are equally e¢ cient.
Asset value of vacancies
Adding up the zero pro…t condition for all vacancies implies that the total cost of maintaining vacancies must be equal to the aggregate rents that …rms make in currently …lled jobs.
The left hand side of this equation is the total cost of vacancies at t = 0. The right hand side is employment, 1 u; times the quasi-rents per worker, which is equal to expected output E x Y minus expected wages E x W .
The reservation value of the mismatch indicators
The de…nition of x as the mismatch indicator of a job which is just acceptable to an unemployed job seeker implies:
Substitution of equation (2) and (4) in the condition V E ( x) = V U yields,
When on and o¤ the job search are equally e¢ cient, = 1, equation (6) simpli…es to:
where the last step follows from (5). Hence, the relation between and x does not depend on expected wages in this case, and consequently neither on whether or not …rms can commit on paying hiring premiums.
The output loss due to search frictions
The de…nition of the output loss due to search frictions is given by:
The output loss is equal to employment, 1 u; times the di¤erence between productivity in the optimal assignment, Y (0) = 1, and the expected productivity in the actual assignment, E x Y , plus unemployment, u; times the di¤erence between the productivity in the optimal assignment and the value of non market time, 1 B, plus the cost of keeping vacancies open, vK. Substitution of equation (2) and (4) in (8) yields:
The last step follows from the fact that by the zero pro…t condition, the cost of maintaining vacancies is equal to the surplus of expected productivity over expected wages, see equation (4) . This is useful because both v and K are hard to measure. The …rst equality tells us that the output loss is equal to the output in the optimal assignment (Y (0) = 1) minus the asset value of unemployment. The second equality in (9) tells us that the output loss is equal to the sum of the output loss for unemployed and for employed workers.
The former is equal to the lost output in the optimal assignment minus the value of non market time, while the latter is equal to the foregone wage income. Under free entry, the di¤erence between wages and productivity is spent on vacancies.
Equilibrium ‡ow conditions
Under both assumptions for wage setting, commitment and no-commitment, wages are a decreasing function of x for x 0, W x (x) > 0, implying that workers accept any job-o¤er with a lower mismatch indicator jxj than their current job. Hence, we can analyze jobto-job ‡ows independent of the exact form of the wage policy W (x). Let G(x); x 0, be the fraction of workers employed in jobs at smaller distance from their optimal job than jxj. This implies that G (0) = 0 and G ( x) = 1, since x is the largest acceptable value of jxj. The golden growth assumption requires that the number of workers employed in jobs with a mismatch indicator lower than x grows at a rate :
The …rst term on the left-hand side is the number of people that …nd a job with mismatch indicator lower than x, either from unemployment (the …rst term in square brackets), or by mobility from jobs with a larger mismatch indicator (the second term in brackets).
The number of better jobs is given by 2x, since the worker can accept jobs both to the left and to the right of her favorite job type x = 0. The second term in brackets is weighted by the factor , re ‡ecting the e¢ ciency of on-relative to o¤-the-job search. The …nal term on the left-hand side is the out ‡ow of workers due to job-destruction. The right-hand side re ‡ects that at the balanced growth path, employment grows at a rate at all levels including the class of workers with a mismatch indicator smaller than x, G (x). Mobility within this class is irrelevant because the disappearance of the old match and the emergence of the new one cancel. Evaluating (10) at x and solving for u yields,
where:
. By a proper choice of the unit of measurement of the mismatch indicator x, the following normalization can be applied without loss of generality:
This normalization requires an adjustment in the parameter to account for the rede…nition of the unit of measurement of x. 4 Apart from this adjustment, all other parameters and variables are una¤ected. We apply this normalization in what follows for the sake of notational convenience. Substitution of (11) into condition (10) gives:
Wage formation
The wage formation processes are the same as in Gautier, Teulings, and Van Vuuren (2010). Since the model is symmetric around x = 0, we can focus on the analysis of
Wage setting with commitment
When …rms can commit on future wage payments, the optimal wage policy of the …rm maximizes the expected value of a vacancy,
where
is the distribution of wages among employed workers and where
is the wage o¤er distribution, using the fact that the distribution of x is uniform by assumption. The e¤ect of b G (W ) on the optimal wage o¤er is the hiring premium, the e¤ect of F (W ) is the no-quit premium. The …rst order condition of this problem reads:
This di¤erential equation can be solved analytically for W (x), using equation (5) as an initial condition, see Appendix A.4.
4 Let x =1 be the normalized version of the mismatch indicator x, x k=1 x and let x =1 x. De…ne =1 2 . Then:
We suppress the subscript = 1 in what follows.
Wage setting without commitment
When …rms cannot commit on future wage payments, hiring premiums are non-credible and. Hence, the term b G (W ) in equation (13) is replaced by 1 G (x) re ‡ecting that the …rst term in brackets does not depend on the wage and that the wage maximizes the value of a …lled job rather than the value of a vacancy. Then, the …rst order condition reads,
The only di¤erence with equation (14) is a factor two, re ‡ecting the fact that …rms pay hiring and no quit premia in the case of commitment, while they pay only a no quit premium in the case without commitment. Again, an analytical solution for W (x) is available, see Appendix A.4.
Characterization of the equilibrium
The shape of the wage function setting the value of non market time at B = 0:6 (which we do in all subsequent plots). We motivate the choice for B in section 3.2. Contrary to Y (x), W (x) is non-di¤erentiable at x = 0. This is due to the hiring and no-quit premiums that …rms pay. Since the density of employment is highest for low values of jxj, the elasticity of labor supply is high for these types of job. A slight variation in wages has large e¤ects both on the probability that workers accept an outside job o¤er and on the number of workers who are prepared to accept the wage o¤er (the latter being relevant in the case with commitment only).
Hence, …rms will bid up wages aggressively for these types of jobs. Figure 3 shows that the wage in the optimal assignment is higher when …rms can commit than when they cannot, since the ability to commit increases competition between …rms for workers. Figure 3 also reveals that for x = 0 the slope of the wage function is smaller (in absolute value) for the case with than without commitment. This is remarkable, since the only di¤erence between the expressions for the slope is a factor 2 in the di¤erential equations for wages for the case with commitment, compare equation (14) and (15) . However, the slope is proportional to the ‡ow pro…ts per worker, i.e. the di¤erence between the productivity and wages, Y (x) W (x) which is more than twice as large 
The impact of on wage di¤erentials
What wage di¤erential and output loss is consistent with a particular value of and (and the corresponding unemployment rate)? The max-mean wage di¤erential is hardly a¤ected by while the mean-min ratio is highly sensitive to it. The reason why does not matter for the max-mean wage di¤erential is that lowering the value of while keeping u constant has two o¤setting e¤ects on wage di¤erentials near the optimal assignment.
The density of x at the optimal assignment is equal to g (0) = + u=(1 u), see equation (12) . Hence, a lower value of implies that there are fewer workers close to the optimal assignment since search by employed workers is less e¢ cient and since employed job seekers are a particularly relevant source of labour supply for an x = 0. This reduces the mean wage. However, unemployed job seekers also become more choosy if goes down since they give up a share 1 of the option value of search by accepting a job. Therefore, the lowest wage W (x) increases and consequently the mean wage increases a bit as well; the total e¤ect is that wage di¤erentials become smaller. For the mean-max di¤erential, the negative and positive e¤ects on the mean wage almost cancel while the maximum wage is una¤ected since there are always some workers around their optimal job.
The max-mean di¤erential on the one hand and the mean-min and max-min wage di¤erentials on the other hand also tell opposite stories about the e¤ect of commitment on wage di¤erentials. Commitment makes …rms compete more …ercely for workers, driving up the maximum wage. Since the minimum wage is the same for the case with and without commitment, this implies that the mean-min ratio is larger under commitment. However, since the slope of the wage function close to the optimal assignment is smaller under commitment, see Figure 3 , the max-mean di¤erential can be smaller with commitment.
Wrapping up
Both versions of the model -commitment and no commitment-yield two analytical relations between the expected wage and the productivity loss due to search frictions on the one hand and the parameters B and and the unemployment rate u on the other hand:
where W (0) E x W is the expected wage loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment, W (0), and mutatis mutandis the same for the expected productivity loss
These relations are derived in Appendix A.4. Hence, keeping B and constant, there is an increasing relation between wage di¤erentials W (0) E x W and the productivity loss
A higher unemployment rate goes hand in hand with both more wage dispersion and a larger productivity loss since all are manifestations of search frictions. In the next section, we set out a method to obtain empirical estimates for
Conditional on the values for B and , these estimates imply a value for the unemployment rate u by equation (17) . When this unemployment rate is in line with the natural rate of unemployment, this fact can be interpreted as empirical evidence in favour of the model.
This test is the topic of the next section. 
This production functions has two features, re ‡ected by the two terms on the right hand side. First, better skilled workers haven an absolute advantage over less skilled workers (the …rst term s). Hence, better skilled workers receive higher wages when employed in their optimal assignment. 5 Second, better skilled workers have a comparative advantage in more complex jobs (the second term 1 2 (s c) 2 ). Hence, in a Walrasian equilibrium, better skilled workers will be employed in more complex jobs. 6 A second order Taylor expansion of the second term of (18) in the optimal assignment x = s c = 0 is equal to 5 Absolute advantage of better skilled workers applies only locally for this speci…cation, since for high values of s the second order term dominates. Teulings and Gautier (2004) use the production function:
where h (c) is some arbitrary function. This function features global absolute advantage:Ŷ s (s; c) > 0 for any s and c. Equation (18) can be interpreted as a second order Taylor expansion of this relation in the market equilibrium where s = c with h (c) = c + 1 :
6 Formally, comparative advantage implies:
Let c (s) be the assignment of worker type s in a Walrasian economy without search frictions. In this economy, everybody is assigned to her optimal assignment, that is, the c-type that yields the highest output Y (s; c). Hence, c (s) = s and the second term of equation (18) vanishes. At …rst sight the linearity of equation (18) in s seems to be a serious limitation to its generality. However, Gautier and Teulings (2006) show that it is not. Since we have not yet de…ned the units of measurement of s yet, the linearity of the …rst term is just a matter of a proper scaling of the skill index. By a similar argument, the fact that equation (18) is constructed such that the optimal assignment is characterized by the simple identity c (s) = s instead of a more general function, is not a restriction to the model, but just a matter of proper scaling of the complexity index c. Hence, the restrictive nature of equation (18) is not in the …rst but in the second term, namely that the coe¢ cient of the second term, , does not vary with s. Implicitly, equation (18) de…nes the units of measurement of s and c (and consequently of the mismatch indicator x = s c): 7 The Mincerian return to the skill index d ln Y =ds is equal to one in the optimal assignment, where s = c. Later on, we use this normalization when constructing our measures for s and c.
In our discussion of the model, we keep constant the distribution of worker-skills and job-complexities at such a level that the Mincerian rate of return to the skill index is equal to unity and that the optimal assignment of worker type is c (s) = s. In reality, the distribution of s and c might shift over time or di¤er between regions. For example, when the average skill level of the workforce increases over time while the distribution of product demand over c-types remains constant, the equilibrium between demand and supply of each c-type requires the optimal assignment and the Mincerian return to human capital to adjust: workers of a particular s type will be assigned to less complex jobs and the Mincerian rate of return to skill will go down. The formal derivation of this argument is relegated to Appendix A.5. This mechanism relates our model to the literature on the the assignment of worker types s to job types c, c (s) is strictly increasing in a Walrasian economy without search frictions, see Teulings (2005) for a more formal treatment. 7 The fact that for the empirical analysis we choose a convenient unit of measurement of the x (such that dw=ds = 1) implies that the normalization = 1 no longer applies. However, we don't need this normalization in the subsequent argument.
change of relative wages due to shifts in the distribution of human capital, see Katz and Murphy (1992) . They estimate the elasticity of complementarity between high and low skilled workers low-high to be 1.4: a 1% increase in the ratio between high and low skilled workers yields a 1.4% fall in the relative wages of high skilled workers. In Appendix A.5
we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between this elasticity low-high and the parameter :
The value of B and
Hall and Milgrom derive a value for B based on UI bene…ts (of 0.25) and an estimated a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. This implies a value of B = 0:71. Since micro studies (see the discussion in Hall, 2009) typically …nd a somewhat smaller labor supply elasticity, we set B at 0:6. 8 We will however also do simulations with B = 0:71:
The value of is identi…ed from the relation between the ratio of the employment-toemployment, f ee ; and the unemployment-to-employment-hazard rate, f ue . In Appendix A.3 we derive that
Unfortunately, the evidence on f ee and f ue for the US yields values of that range from above 1, see Nagypal (2008) For these studies, the value of non-market time of the marginal worker is relevant whereas here we are interested in the value of non-market time for the average worker so a lower value of B is justi…ed. 9 The value of f ee is 2.7% according to Fallick and Fleischman (2004) , 2.9% according to Nagypal and after a correction for missing records in the CPS, Moscarini and Vella (2008) get a value of 3.3%. Nagypal's values come from the SIPP and the CPS. She argues that those estimates are downwardly biased because when workers …nd a new job when employed but there is a lag in starting this new job, it is not uncommon to brie ‡y register to be unemployed. In the data this implies an employmentunemployment transition followed by an unemployment-employment transition. She argues that this bias is larger than the time aggregation bias in the unemployment out ‡ow rate (some workers loose and …nd a job between the interview dates).
hazard rate f eu , which equals 3% per month. This high value of f eu is problematic.
According to the BLS statistics, median tenure is 53 months. In the absence of duration dependence and ignoring the ‡ow out of the labor forces, this implies that the total hazard out of the current job, f ee +f eu , is 1.3%. 10 The transition rate f eu (the equivalent of in our model) is assumed to be constant in our model, while the unconditional transition rate, f ee ; exhibits negative duration dependence due to heterogeneity in the match quality x:
high quality matches survive. Negative duration dependence implies that the hazard rate for low-tenure workers is above 1.3% and the rate for high tenure workers is below 1.3%.
Since f eu is constant, it must be smaller than 1.3%, much lower than the value reported by Shimer. This implies that the assumption of the absence of duration dependence of f eu is rejected by the data. Apparently, a small group of weakly attached workers frequently ‡ow between un-and employment. In order to capture this feature of reality, other mechanisms have to be introduced, like learning, see Moscarini (2005) , or random growth, see Buhai and Teulings (2006) . This falls outside the scope of this paper. Hence, our model is ill suited to explain this particular feature of reality. Reasonable estimates of f ee =f ue vary from 0:076 to 0:132. 11 A value for u of about 5% and of 0:5 yields f ee =f ue = 0:085 while a value of of 0:75 yields f ee =f ue = 0:100. In our main analysis we set = 0:5 but we also run simulations for = 0:75: Those values are not sensitive to small changes in u.
Inference on wages and mismatch
This section describes how we can use data on wages and worker and job characteristics to construct empirical measures of s and c, and hence of the mismatch indicator x = s c, and how we can use these data for inference on the magnitude of wage di¤erentials
The challenging aspect of this exercise is that any empirical measure of s and c will be contaminated by measurement error. Hence, when we use these measures to construct a measure of mismatch x = s c, the observed mismatch can be either 10 Ignoring ‡ows out of the labor force, the total hazard outof employment can be solved from the result of measurement error in s or c, or it can be a re ‡ection of real mismatch, or any combination of these two. Even in a perfect Walrasian equilibrium, we would still observe "mismatch" due to measurement error though in fact everybody is assigned to her optimal assignment. The observed variation in s c therefore exceeds its true variation.
Our procedure should therefore explicitly allow for measurement error. This subsection sets out the main line of the argument, using Taylor expansions of the wage function. In the next subsection we provide numerical simulations of the exact relation between our empirical statistics and the model and check the precision of these approximations.
The wage function that goes with the production function (18) 
where w denotes the log wage in deviation from its mean, ! 0 > 0; ! 1 > 0 and ! 2 > 0 and s is orthogonal on s c. The parameter ! 2 is interpreted as an estimate of
. We conveniently de…ne skill indexes s and c in deviation from their mean. Hence, if there were no search frictions, so that s = c for all jobs, then the intercept ! 0 would be equal to zero. In the presence of search frictions, the intercept measures the expected wage loss due to frictions:
The …rst equality follows from taking expectations at the left and right hand side of (20) and noting that E[ŵ(s; c)] = E[s] = 0: The second equality follows from evaluating (20) at x s c = 0: The next inequality is due to Jensen's inequality, lnE x W >E x ln W .
For the …nal step, note that for small search frictions, and hence small wage di¤erentials, W (x) . W (0) . 1, so that the approximation ln W . W 1 applies. The idea is to use the intercept ! 0 as a proxy for the max-mean di¤erence, W (0) E x W . The numerical simulations that we will present in section 3.5 provide a test of the precision of this approximation. We …nd that almost no precision is lost by using (20) . Furthermore, since
Var[x] by equation (16), the variance of x provides an estimate of the productivity loss due to search frictions. These estimates would then allow us to evaluate equation (17) . The only remaining problem is how to deal with measurement error.
Suppose we estimate equation (20) Let " x be the measurement error in b x, where " x is assumed to have zero mean and to be uncorrelated with x: b x = x + " x , and hence:
were a perfect approximation of ln W (s c), the estimated value of ! 2 will be a biased estimator of ! 2 E[js cj] due to the strong convexity of the wage function at x = 0, since the expected value of jxj conditional on its observed part b x is always greater or equal to jb xj:
The closer b x is to zero, the stronger this inequality. This is documented in Figure 5 , where we present three functions, jb xj, E[jxj jb x], and the least squares estimation of E[jxj jb x] = 0 + 2 b x 2 + ", for the case that both the true value x and measurement error " x are normally distributed with equal variance equal to unity. The least square approximation of E[jxj jb x] is fairly precise for jb xj < 2:5. Since the variance of b x is normalized to unity, this covers the complete relevant range. The following proposition relates the least squares coe¢ cients to the underlying structural model, see Appendix 7 for the proof:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the true model reads:
where both w and x are normalized to have a zero mean. Suppose that we observe only where " is a zero mean error term. Then:
Hence, when there is no measurement error in the observed signal b x, so that the signal-noise ratio, R = 1, ! 0 is equal to half the expected wage loss due to frictions. This underestimation by a factor two is due to the imperfect approximation of the absolute value by the quadratic speci…cation. When on top of this imperfection in the functional form, there is also measurement error in the signal b x, the underestimation becomes even more severe. The estimate of ! 0 is proportional to the signal-to-noise ratio R:
This justi…es the idea of approximating the underlying model (20) 
Under the assumption of joint normality of b x and " x , Proposition 1 implies the following relation between W (0) E x W and the estimated parameters ! 0 and ! 2 (see Appendix A.6),
The higher the variance of the measurement error x the smaller the signal-to-noise ratio R, the smaller the estimated value of ! 0 and the more W (0) E x W is underestimated by ! 0 . Furthermore, the productivity loss due to search frictions satis…es
When Var[b x] is used as a proxy for Var [x] , the productivity loss is overestimated by a factor R 1 , exactly the reverse of the underestimation of the expected wage loss compared to the wage in the optimal assignment. We can eliminate the signal noise ratio from these two expressions to obtain a relation between the expected wage loss and the expected productivity loss:
We have estimates for all variables on the left hand side of this approximate equality.
Apart from the Taylor expansion in equation (20), this expression relies on the approximate normality of the distribution of x.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the equality version of equation (22) and equation (17) from section 2. Equation (22) has a negative slope, equation (17) has a positive slope, so there is at most one intersection. The locus of equation (22) Hence, this intersection implies a value for the unemployment rate. Note that there are two versions of equation (17), one for the case where …rms can commit to pay hiring premiums and one where they cannot. The intersection for the case with commitment corresponds to u is 5% (for the case without commitment we …nd similar values). Table 1 presents the theoretical relation between (true) wage dispersion, mismatch and unemployment for increasing frictions as predicted by the model. So for B = 0:6
and given an unemployment rate of 4%, the table shows that the di¤erence between the maximum and mean wage is 3:47%.and the average worker produces 1:32% less than he would at his optimal job type.
Measuring wages and mismatch
For the construction of empirical measures for the observed part of workers' skill level b s and the level of job complexity b c we use a methodology spelled out in Gautier and 
wherex andz are vectors of observed worker and job characteristics respectively, 12 where " w captures measurement error in log wages, and where " s and " c capture (i) unobserved characteristics of workers and jobs respectively and (ii) the e¤ect non-optimal assignment on wages. It is convenient to normalize our data onx andz such that they have zero mean. Since we have de…ned w to have a zero mean too, it does not make sense to include a constant in this regression. The estimated parameter vector can then be used to construct indices for the observed worker and job characteristics:
Again, both indices have zero mean by construction. 13 So, the skill measure is the predicted wage conditional on worker characteristics and the job complexity level is the predicted wage conditional on job characteristics. The skill measure satis…es our normalization of the Mincerian rate-of-return-to-skill index (dw=ds = 1), see equation (18) . 12 We apply the following personal characteristics: gender, total years of schooling, a third-order polynomial in experience, highest completed education, being married, having a full-or part-time contract as well as various cross terms of experience, education, and being married. As job characteristics, 520 occupation and 242 industry dummies are applied. 13 We also normalize s and c such that in a regression: w = 1 s + 2 s 2 + " w , 2 = 0 and the same for c, see Gautier and Teulings (2006) for details.
Next, we use these indices and estimate
The second regression imposes two restrictions ! ss = ! cc = ! sc . At …rst sight, this Table 2 shows that for both alternative combinations, putting education and occupation inx or putting education and industry inx (and the remaining variables inz), the concavity result becomes either much weaker or even breaks down. Hence, the concavity result only survives when worker and job characteristics are separated in two groups and it is not a statistical artifact.
Numerical simulations
The derivation of equation (22) in section 3.3 relies upon Taylor approximations and the approximation of the distribution of x by a normal. In this section, we simulate or model 15 We thank Jean Marc Robin for the idea of this test. which is still acceptable. The model also generates substantial wage dispersion even when unemployment is low. Only when B is high and is low, the mean-min ratio is small (see the discussion in Hornstein et al. 2011 ) but the max mean ratio is still large.
The expected productivity loss due to mismatch ( 3.6 Unemployment and composition of the output loss Table 5 shows for our baseline parameters that if …rms can commit to wages, the output loss due to search friction is 6.6% while if …rms cannot commit, it is 6.7%. So interestingly, the estimated output loss is not very sensitive to whether …rms can or cannot commit to wages. If they can commit, a larger share of the loss is due to unemployment and mismatch. In the no-commitment case because of a business-stealing externality (see Gautier et.al. (2010) , a larger share is due to vacancy creation cost. The idea is that without commitment, when opening a vacancy, individual …rms do not internalize the future output loss of the …rm they will poach a worker from. Although the transitions of workers to better matches are always e¢ cient, the expected productivity gains are too small to justify the entry cost of the marginal …rm from a social point of view.
16 Table 5 is not suitable to estimate the business-stealing e¤ect because again it re ‡ects given calibration exercises. In order to estimate the business stealing e¤ect, we keep all primitives constant and compare X with and without commitment. Note that we also no longer can keep constant and have to assume an explicit matching function. We take the quadratic of Gautier et al. (2009 frictions such that u = 5:0% and X = 6:6 (which can be shown to be almost …rst best) and switching to the no commitment case will lead to excessive vacancy creation such that u drops to 2:9% and X = 7:5%. If …rms cannot commit, the welfare loss due to the business-stealing externality would therefore be almost 1%: Table 5 also shows that the output loss due to mismatch is about the same in magnitude as the output loss due to unemployment which together are responsible for a bit more than half of the total output loss.
Conclusion
Because of frictions only a subset of the contacts between vacancies and workers results in a match and this creates (i) unemployment, (ii) wage dispersion amongst identical workers and (iii) mismatch. Our contribution is that we measure all those manifestations of search frictions (allowing for measurement error) and that we present a model that can jointly explain the observed values. Speci…cally, we ask our model which unemployment rate corresponds to observed wage dispersion and mismatch. The model predicts an unemployment rate of around 5%, which is evidence for its validity and therefore we feel con…dent to use it to estimate the output loss due to search frictions.
Search frictions directly generate output losses due to the fact that resources are allocated sub-optimally and indirectly because decentralized wage mechanisms potentially come with distortions. Allowing for two-sided heterogeneity is extremely important because it is the interaction between the search frictions, the type distributions and the production technology that determines how important these frictions are. If workers are identical and …rms are identical then all contacts result in a match. Under two-sided heterogeneity, the production technology matters because it speci…es how much output is lost when a given job type is occupied by a sub-optimal worker type. Search frictions generate a lot of output loss if a precize match is very important while if worker types are almost perfect substitutes, the output loss will be modest. By combining information on wage dispersion and the substitutability of worker types we can learn about the actual amount of frictions and the importance of a precize match. We then use our model to quantify and decompose this total output loss. Traditionally, most of the macro labor literature focussed on unemployment but our results imply that mismatch and job creation cost are at least as important. We …nd this total loss is between 5% and 10% (for the value of Other contributions of our paper are that we show that the max-mean wage di¤erential is a more robust measure for wage dispersion than measures based on the reservation wage because workers move towards the best jobs so the density around the highest wage is a lot higher than around the lowest wage. We also discuss a simple and tractable method for estimating the size of wage di¤erentials allowing for measurement error. Finally, we derive a relation between Katz and Murphy's (1992) elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled workers and the second derivative of the production function of our model.
A Appendix

A.1 Derivation of the asset values
The Bellman equation for the asset value of employment reads
Totally di¤erentiating (26) yields
The solution to this di¤erential equation is
Integrating by parts yields
Evaluating (28) at x = 0 gives an initial condition that can be used to solve for C 0
Substitution of this equation into (28) yields the desired expression. Let E x W R x 0 g (x) W (x) dx be the expected wage of a …lled job. Evaluate (3) at x and use the de…nition of g in (12) to get
Next, note that the right-hand side of (26) and (29) are equal which can be used to get an expression for
as a function of W ( x); which can be eliminated by solving (29) for W ( x). This gives
where the …nal step uses (11) . The free entry condition implies that the option value of a vacancy of type c must be
Y (x) dx, we obtain:
The …rst term in the integrand is the e¤ective labor supply, u + (1 u) [1 G (x)] for a vacancy of type x. It is equal to the number of unemployed, u plus the number of workers employed in jobs with a mismatch indicator that exceeds x,
The second factor is the discounted value of a …lled vacancy. Just as in the wage equation, we discount current revenue Y (x) W (x) by the discount rate plus the separation rate plus the quit rate 2 x. The second line follows from substituting (11) and (12) in.
A.2 Variance of x
Note that by the de…nition of g(x), the support of G( 
where we …rst apply change of variables, q = x, dx = 1 dq and then repeatedly use partial integration. The last equation follows from (6) and (7) 
A.5 The derivation of
We follow the derivation in Teulings and Van Rens (2008) . Due to the assumption of comparative advantage of skilled workers in complex jobs, the optimal assignment is an increasing function, c 0 (s) > 0. Let Y be aggregate output per worker. We assume that this output is produced by a Leontie¤ technology, requiring the input of all c-type jobs in …xed proportions. Let h (c) be the density of the input of a c-type job required to produce one unit of aggregate output. Equilibrium on the commodity market for job type c (s) requires the equality of supply and demand for each s-type:
where g (s) is the skill density function. The left hand side is the demand for the output of job type c (s); it is equal to aggregate output Y times the density of job type c (s) required per unit of aggregate output, h [c (s)]. The right hand side is the supply of output of job type c (s); it is equal to the density of worker type s, times its productivity in job type c (s), Y [s; c (s)] times the Jacobian ds=dc = 1=c 0 (s). We assume s and c to be distributed normally with mean s and c respectively and identical standard deviations s = c = . Teulings and Gautier (2004) show that locally (around the optimal assignment) the distribution of s and c can be approximated by a uniform. Without loss of generality, we normalize c = 2 ; the only thing that matters in this model turns out to be the di¤erence between s and c . Taking logs in equation (35) and using the density function for h ( ) and g ( ) yields, 
where we use equation (18) in the second equality. The system of equations (36) and (37) is solved by the following expressions for c (s) and W (s):
The wage function ln W (s) is linear in s. d ln W (s) =ds = 1 s is the return to the human capital index s. This return depends on the supply of human capital, that is, on the mean of the skill distribution. The equilibrium assignment of section 3.4, c (s) = s, implies that s = 0. In that case d ln W (s) =ds = 1, as is implied by equation (18) . A percentage point upward shift in the mean of the skill distribution, s , reduces the return to human capital by % point. Katz and Murphy split labour into two skill groups, low and high, and consider the e¤ect on relative wages of a shift in labour supply from the one to the other. Let s be the cut o¤ level. All worker types with s > s are classi…ed as high skilled; all other workers as low skilled. we choose a starting value for u, which implies a value for x and conditional on the normalization = 1, see equation (11) for x and equation (32) or (34) in Appendix A.4 for (depending on whether we assume commitment or not). In step 2 we generate 100,000 draws from the distribution G (x), see equation (12) and calculate the corresponding value of w = ln W (x), using equation (31) or (33), taking deviations from the mean of w (as we did with or data) so that E[w] = 0. We then renormalize the values of x according to the normalization dw=ds = 1 and the associated value dw=ds=1 = 2.
18 In step 3, we add normally distributed measurement error to these values of x and choose the variance of the measurement error such that we get the estimated mismatch, Var[b x] = 0:0306. Then, we "estimate" by OLS:
If the "estimated" value of ! 0 is below 0:0241 (the value in 25), the model generates too little wage dispersion which implies that we should increase u, and the other way around if ! 0 is above 0:0241. Then, we return to step 1. This iteration process is continued till u converges. 19 In both our baseline calibration and our robustness checks we were able to match ! 0 and Var[b x] exactly.
see footnote 4. 19 This usually takes about 20 steps and lasts a few seconds.
